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r ';I. TAYLOR, et.£!., 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
~~;:.,:.,1p~ PETROLEUM COMPANY, 
1 Jelawar'e COr'POr'ation, ~al., 
Consolidated Cases 
Defendants-Respondents. 
No. 19160 
'cS?H PAZZIO' et .£!.' and 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, No. 19161 
'!. 
?dC,LIP0 PETROLEUM COMPANY, 
a Delawar'e cor'por'ation, et al., 
Defendants-Respondents. 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
I. RE:5PU!l0ENT'S STATEMENT OF FACTS RAISES FACTUAL ISSUES 
Fr'om the Statement of Facts of the appellants' br'ief and in 
'1e respondent's brief, it is clear that ther'e is a dispar'ity between 
'''" rsions of the facts of the r'espective par'ties in this case. 
P this is an Appeal fr'om a Motion to Dismiss under' Rule 12(b)(6) 
• r, 1:tah Rules of Civil Procedur'e these factual disputes pr'eclude 
,1 ,,r the appellant-plaintiffs' case as a matter' of cour'se. 
2 
It is not the nature of this reply brief to peview these factual 
disputes. However, a reply should be made to certain factual 
misconceptions which are contained in the respondent's brief. 
Respondent makes note of, "Appellants' curious decision ts 
make two lawsuits out of this dispute instead of one." Quite sim,:~, 
two lawsuits were brought because of the facts. Certain lands were 
leased by the respondent. Part of these lands were excluded from 
participating in royalties from the Roosevelt Unit. The 
non-participating lands were subject to a different, superseding 
lease, which was entered into by the parties more than two years afc' 
the lands were excluded from the participating area. Since there;, 
very different factual situation which concerns only these 
non-participating lands, a separate action was filed for them in ~'.' 
court below. 
Certain statements and matters which are stated in 
respondent's Statement of Facts indicate that the respondent appe!~ 
to be laboring under misconceptions of the facts. 
Respondent first states that the 1946 lease er1tered into s. 
the parties is different in the real property which the 1945 lease: 
covered. While this is literally true, it distorts what actu~l~~ 
happened. The 1945 leases executed by Wilford L. \.ihitlock, ~ .. 
(K.55) and Leslie B. Taylor, et ux, (H.~CJ) cover 12in1cc Jn.~ 
3 
\fl Township 1 South, Range 1 East and lands in Sections 23 and 
• 7ownship 1 South, Range 1 West all in the Uintah Special 
''. 2 rid1ar1. The 1946 lease only covers those lands in Section 24. 
c::.:.1b1ts to the lioosevelt Unit Agreement (which were omitted from the 
respondent's Exhibit "A" to its Motion to Dismiss but which are 
verlflej in one of the agreements of March 11, 1952, R.148) indicate 
t~at at the time respondent obtained the 1946 lease on the lands in 
~e::ion 24 owned by the appellants and their predecessors in interest, 
it also obtained leases on these other sections contained in the 1945 
ieases. In effect what it did was consolidate two leases into three 
li:ases. 
Although it is true that the actual delay rental paid on the 
:~~S lease is less than what was paid on the 1945 leases, there was no 
:~1ange in the rate at which the delay rental was paid, 1.e. 25¢ per 
acre. Respondent was required to pay that delay rental on all these 
u\her lands which it purported to lease in 1945 and attempted to lease 
°''"'c1 in 1946. Respondent's conclusion that the 1946 lease vastly 
:l"fers from the 1945 leases just is not true. 
Another misconception in respondent's statement of facts is 
,"i 1ri page six of its brief, wherein it states that the revision of 
:•\al partic1pat1n~ area of the Roosevelt Unit, contracting the 
\~l~de t~e lands in question was effective February 1, 1952, 
I' weeks later the appellant, Audrey W. Taylor, her husband 
1 PXecuted an agreement ratifying the terms of the unit 
4 
agreement. This is not entirely correct. The application for 
approval of the first revised participating area for the Green hi 1,. 
Formation (R.122) indicates that the application was not submitte1 
until November 28, 1952, and only approved by the United States 
Geologlcal Survey on January 13, 1953. At the time the appellant 3,, 
other lessors entered into the agreement, the application had note.• 
been prepared. 
Respondent mentions an agreement dated March 11, 1952, 
whereby the lessors ratified the unit agreement. However respor1den: 
neglects to mention another agreement of that date between the par'.i: 
which indicates that, "Notwithstanding the provisions of the unit 
agreement .•. unless lessee shall on or before November 12, 1952 
commence or cause to be commenced operations for drilling a well 
[on the leased property], the said lease shall terminate." (R.122,. 
Certainly the existence of this second agreement is relevant to t~ 
issues raised in the third cause of action of that case (Case No. 
19161) which involves the non-participating lands. 
This action revolves around the central fact that for o·:;: 
37 years respondent has failed to develop certain lands it purports 
hold under lease. This is in spite of covenants implied in the ;e;• 
and the second agreement of March 11, 1952, which expressly ~~ii' 
the term of the lease and the unit agreement requiring the 1~ 
of the property within a few short months. 
5 
·1 fHL ADDITION OF MATTERS OUTSIDE THE PLEADINGS PRESENTED IN A 
):i UNDEH THE CIVIL HULE 12(b) DOES NOT ALTER THE BURDE!J THAT MUST 
BL BORNE BY THE RESPONDENT TO PREVAIL ON ITS MOTION TO DISMISS. 
In an untitled portion of respondent's argument, respondent 
1ppears to imply that because matters outside the pleadings were 
c0 nsidered, and requested by the court below in ruling on respondent's 
Motion to Dismiss, there exists a different burden which the 
res~ondent must meet to prevail on its Motion to Dismiss under Rule 
121b). This is just not the case. Questions of fact may not be 
resolved without a trial in any circumstance. As stated by the United 
.itates Supreme Court: 
According to Rule 12(b) and its associated 
Rule 56, summary judgment may be rendered only 
if there are no genuine issues of fact to be 
resolved. The judgment is authorized only 
where the moving party is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law, where it is quite clear 
what the truth is, and that no genuine issue 
remains for trial. Sartor v. Arkansas Gas 
Corporation, 321 U.S. 620, 623, 64 S. Ct. 724, 
88 L. Ed. 967. 2A Moore's Federal Practice, 
Paragraph 12.09 at 2311. 
This court, in Holbrook Company v. Adams, 542 P.2d 191 
1tah 1975) has considered this issue in a situation procedurally 
s'.milar to the present. There, a complaint was filed to recover the 
·l 01· work and materials supplied to a private liquor club. A 
fie~ motion to dismiss was filed whereby the defendant claimed 
JefenJant did not enter a contract with the plaintiff for the 
6 
In response to the motion, plaintiff filed an affidavit signed by,. 
president alleging certain facts which would raise an issue as to 
whether or not the defendant contracted for the services. The tria; 
court dismissed, but granted the plaintiff ten days to refile its 
complaint. The plaintiff appealed. 
This court was unable to distinguish whether the trial co·" 
ruled under Rule 12(b)(6) or Rule 56, but stated that the mere 
existence of factual issues precluded summary disposition of the cas' 
without trial: 
It is not the purpose of summary judgment procedure 
to judge the credibility of averments of the parties, 
or witnesses, or the weight of evidence. Neither is 
it to deny parties the right to a trial to resolve 
disputed issues of fact. Its purpose is to 
eliminate the time, trouble and expense of trial when 
upon any view taken of the facts as asserted by the 
party ruled against, he would not be entitled to 
prevail. Only when it so appears, is the court 
justified in refusing such a party of the opportunity 
of presenting his evidence and attempting to 
persuade the fact trier to his views. Conversly, 
if there is any dispute as to any issue, material 
to the settlement of the controversy, the summary 
judgment should not be granted. (At 193) 
See also Bekins Bar V Ranch v. Utah Farm Production Credit 
Association, 587 P.2d 151 (Utah 1978); Harvey v. Sanders, 534 P.2d 
905 (Utah 1975) 
III. RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENTS DO NOT SUPPORT DIS'lISSAL OF TLJUSE 1~' 1L' 
OF ACTION RELATIVE TO f\ESPOHDENT 'S BHCACH OF H1PLH~D CUVL'.JA;: ~: 
A. Inconsistent Causes of Action in the Complaint are Acr~_i'' 
under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
In Section IA of respondent's ur·ief, it is statC;'J '11 11 
7 
'lants' claims based on the implied covenants are "fundamentally 
·n~r.nsistent" with appellants' other claims that the lease had 
r•rninated or was never actually, lawfully in existence. The 
app~llants have no quarrel with the fact that its claims are 
'.;1consistent with each other, but questions the relevance respondent's 
argument at the present stage of the proceedings. The motion brought 
telow was a Motion to Dismiss the complaint. Under the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, inconsistent pleadings may be made and no election is 
~equired between them at the pleading stage of the proceedings. 
Rule 8(e)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states: 
A party may set forth two or more statements of 
a claim or defense alternatively or hypothetically, 
either in one count or defense or in separate 
counts or defenses. When two or more statements 
are made in the alternative and one of them if 
made independently would be sufficient, the 
pleading is not made insufficient by the 
insufficiency of one or more of the alternative 
statements. A party may also state as many 
separate claims or defenses as he has regardless 
of consistency and whether based on legal or 
equitable grounds or both. All statements shall 
be made subject to the obligations set forth in 
Rule 11. 
Professor Moore comments, with respect to the Federal Rules 
c~ r:1vil Procedure, upon which the Utah Hules are modeled, 
!ternative or hypothetical pleading by its very nature is 
,, is tent. This, however, is not a valid objection under Rule 
iA Moore's Federal Practice paragraph 8.32 at B-290. 
8 
cf Rosander v. Larsen, 14 Ut. 2d 1, 376 P.2d 14G (lg(i2). 
B. Notice of Respondent's Breach of Implied Covenants is a Factu, 
Question, not subject to Summary Dispositior. by the Court Below. -
Respondent, by way of a string citation, states a genera; 
principle that notice of breach of implied covenants, and opportunlt. 
to cure, is required before the termination of any oil and gas leas'. 
Reference is made to the the appellants' brief for the argument tha'. 
the question before the Court is not the necessity of notice, but tr,, 
sufficiency of notice, which is a factual issue, not subject to 
summar·y dismissal under either Rule 12(b) or Rule 56. 
The affidavit of Joseph Fazzio (R.122) indicates the hew~ 
in contact with employees of the respondent and that through his 
communications he notified them that respondents should release any 
claims to the leased property excluded from the unit because of 
respondent's failure to develop it. 
Referring specifically to the letter of Carl Noel (R.1511, 
Mr. Noel goes through quite a lengthy narrative of the history oft~ 
lease to indicate why he feels that Respondent's treatment of 
appellants was not in good faith. Even in this letter, which the 
respondent claims gives no notice of its breach of the implied 
covenants, Mr. Noel closes his letter by stating: 
Three of the original lessors of these lands are 
now deceased without having the benefit of 
development which they hoped to see. Their 
9 
heirs deserve better treatment. They deem your 
course of action to be actionable, outrageous 
conduct. I doubt that your conduct has been in 
good faith and fair dealing that the court had 
in mind in the Peterson case. (Emphasis added). 
(R.155) 
Certainly this statement indicates dissatisfaction with 
respondent's failure to develop the lands it claims to hold under 
lease. This responsibility to develop alluded to in the Noel letter 
lo the same responsibility to develop the leasehold premises implied 
'.r1 the lease. Case law cited in the appellants' brief indicates that 
the specificity which respondent claims is required to put it on 
notice of its breach of the implied covenants is not necessary if the 
facts indicate that the breaching party was aware, or should have been 
••are, of its breach. A failure to develop certain lands which are 
purported to be held under lease for over thirty years would seem to 
'ive respondent, a very large oil company, notice that it may not be 
meeting its responsibilities implied in the lease. The mere fact that 
'.t made delay rental payments for over thirty years on this parcel of 
!a~d would call attention to the fact that it was purporting to hold 
, .ese lands not really by production, but by a technical loophole 
•~ich respondent now claims to be created by certain provisions in the 
-e~se as affected by certain other provisions in the unit agreement. 
Even without all the evidence outlined above that notice of 
-r1<lPnt's breach was given to it, the Federal District Court for 
trict of Kansas has ruled that proof of actual notice in this 
10 
type of case is not necessary. Judge Sam A. Crow, in Amoco Prodw 
Co. v. Douglas Energy Company, et al., Civil No. 82-1865 (filed 
February 11, 1983) denied Amoco's Motion to Dismiss which is very 
similar to respondent's in this case. (A copy of the Memorandum ar,: 
Order filed by the court is attached hereto for the convenience of ~ 
court and respondent). In that case Amoco leased many parcels of 
property from a large number of lessors for over 35 years. It 
produced natural gas from the property but had failed to drill into 
deeper strata where there existed proven natural gas reserves. 
Douglas Energy top-leased many of these parcels. Amoco sued Doug'.JO, 
and Douglas, together with many land owners, counterclaimed, 
requesting an adjudication that Amoco had breached its implied 
covenants for further exploration and requested an order terminatin; 
leases ac; to these deeper strata. There is no all ega ti on on the r·ir· 
of the counterclaimants that notice had been given to Amoco of its 
breach. Amoco's motion was centered on alleged lack of notice of l:• 
breach. 
Judge Crow denied Amoco's Motion to Dismiss on the grounds 
that the land owners' notice would have been futile and that 35 year· 
without exploration was sufficient. The court rejected Amoco's 
assertation that any production under the lease holds all the lez,;P. 
As to the question of notice the court stated: 
A demand for performance, however, may be cxcusP·i 
when it appears it would be futile. ,;ee 5 Y.unt?. -~ 
Treatise on the Law of Oil and Gas, ;G2.~ i.1978;. 
See also Howarton v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., ~l 
11 
Kansas 553, 106 P.47, (1910, reversed on other 
grounds, 82 Kan. 367, 108 P.813 (1910)). 
Memorandum decision at 7-8. 
cuurt concluded: 
Defendants are entitled to the opportunity to trial 
to satisfy waiver of the demand requirement by showing 
a manifest intention on the part of Amoco not to 
undertake further development or exploration. 
(Memorandum decision at 9). 
ere also United States v. City of Pawhuska, 502 F.2d 821 (10th Cir. 
:~74, The affidavit of Joseph Fazzio and all the materials from the 
file or the Roosevelt Unit, and the actual existence of the release of 
the 1954 lease indicate that respondent had no intention of developing 
'.~e property and that any additional requests that respondent perform 
were futile. 
The Unitization Clause Contained in the 1946 Lease Does Not 
Preclude Suit for Breach of Covenants Implied in the Lease. 
Respondent asserts a fairly novel position that paragraph 12 
J{ the oil and gas lease executed by the appellants and their 
P'edecessors in interest, which is a standard Producers 88 lease form, 
;re~ludes an action against respondent for its breach of the 
'"''
0 na:1ts implied in the lease to develop the known oil and gas 
;r,)jucing formations and to explore further others. 
Para~raph 12 of the lease states that the terms of the lease 
hP modified to conform with the terms, conditions and provisions 
!lilt plan. Paragraph 16 of the unit agreement states: 
The development and operation of the land subject 
Lo this ar:;ree:nent under the terms and the continuer! 
12 
operation of the well or wells now drilled or 
drilled in the unit area shall be deemed full 
performance of all obligations for development and 
operation with respect to each and every part or 
separately owned tract subject to this agreement. 
The land subject to the unit agreement include only "land committed. 
this agreement." Since the contraction of the unit, the lands 
covered by Case No. 19161 were not within the unit and therefore no: 
subject to the agreement. Development and operation of lands retain' 
within the unit certainly cannot be seen to be "full performance ~ 
all obligations for development and performance" on non-participatl~ 
lands. 
Respondent, by introducing this issue at this time, also 
raises additional factual questions as to whether or not respondent 
has met "full performance of all obligations for development and 
performance" under the unit agreenen t. If ful 1 pe rfornance provides 
respondent with a defense to the action for breach of the implied 
covenants, then the burden is on respondent to prove full performa,.:t 
has been rendered. 
Paragraph 9 of the unit agreement outlines an involved 
program for unit development. This factual issue cannot be discussc~ 
at this point simply because of the difficulty of addressing it at 
the appellate level. It does not appear that the respondent hc1s flt' 
an affidavit claiming that it, or its successors and assigns, hav• 
performed all the requirements for development under the unit 
13 
~,,·eement. In a letter obtained from the files of the United States 
'eological Survey (R.229) dated June 30, 1954, from the USGS to Carter 
vll Company, then unit operator for the Roosevelt Unit, it appears 
that n plan for development was rejected because of a failure to 
,roperly develop the unit. As stated in the letter: 
We advised you in approving the temporary plan 
of January 11 and in our letters of March 5 and 26 
that some drilling should be done this year to 
correct the inequities in the participation and 
to further develop this large unit area. This 
has also been mentioned orally and in connection 
with other unit areas; although, we consider the 
Roosevelt situation the most noticeable and 
critical. Hence, I believe you understand the 
situation ••••• 
This Survey has been quite liberal in granting 
extensions of time for drilling of additional 
test wells seeking a discovery; also in 
considering the need for further geologic and 
engineering studies, market, climatic, and 
other conditions under which discoveries have 
been made. However, it becomes more apparent 
all the time that such benefits are favorable 
mainly to the working interest owners and 
usually are detrimental to the royalty and other 
interests, who are penalized by the slower 
development. Such parties have sometimes in 
the past, and may be more inclined in the 
future to refuse to commit their interest to 
unit agreements •••• 
When a unit area is developed to the point where 
the unit operator feels that further development 
is not necessary, the area should be contracted 
to improve the limits of the participating area 
by reasonable 40-acre subdivisions. There is no 
justification for keeping all the lands outside 
the participating area subject to the unit 
agreement. If the operator does not wish to 
drill the land, he should surrender those rights 
within a reasonable time in order that someone 
else may have an opportunity. 
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The gist of the fifth and sixth causes of action in Case~ 
19161 and the third and fourth causes of action in Case No. 19160 l 
that respondent has not acted reasonably and responsibly in develop'.· 
its leasehold interest. No response has been made to these allegatl:-
other than to question whether or not notice of respondent's bPeach-
implied covenants has been given. The appellants should be given t'.' 
opportunity to discover through the means supplied undeP the Pules 
of civil pPocedure whether or not the unit operator, who was the agt .. 
for the respondent in the development of the unit area, complied wi" 
the requiPements for unit development. Even under respondent's 
aPguments, without compliance with the unit development plan the 
implied covenants contained in the lease are still in effect. 
The Tenth Circuit Court in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. 
Peterson, 218 F.2d 926 (10th Cir. 1954) found that these implied 
covenants still bind this particular respondent, despite the 
respondent's intePpPetation of the lease and unit agreement. The 
court there noted that the potential for abuse by the lessee is 
enormous when a lease has been joined to a unit. Because of this, 
lessee's obligation for reasonable development Pemains as to the 
acPeage which does not paPticipate in the unit. Somers v. Haines 
Trust and Savings Bank, 566 P.2d 775, 779 (Kan. App. 1977). 
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The Tenth Circuit Court has stated: 
The practice of unitization by a power granted 
the Lessee in advance, if faithfully carried out, 
will be fair and profitable both to the lessor and 
the Lessee, and is vital to the oil and gas 
industry in the interest of conservation of both 
natural and material resources. It should be 
upheld, although the grant of power is in general 
terms, because it is subject to implied terms that 
will prevent arbitrary and unfair dealing, will 
require compliance with the implied covenants in the 
lease for the benefit of the Lessor and will impose 
a rigid standard of good faith on the part of the 
Lessee. Peterson, supra. at 933. 
Hespondent claims that the terms of the lease, as affected 
)Y the unit agreement, preclude appellants from bringing any action 
:or breach of implied covenants to develop and further explore. 
:;) citation of authority is contained in respondent's argument on this 
r.:int. It is clear from the cases cited above that the courts differ 
''.th respondent on this point. It should be noted that this argument 
also raises additional issues of fact which must be addressed only by 
'.~e trier of facts. 
The Judicial Ascertainment Clause is not Relevant at this Point 
in the Proceedings. 
Another argument introduced by the respondent in its brief 
's that the judicial ascertainment clause contained in the 1946 lease 
-·!Jjes termination by the court of the lease on account of 
·;;· jent's breach of the implied lease covenants. First, it should 
.. 1 that tt1ose causes of action requesting termination and 
t~tion of the lease on the basis of breach of the implied 
16 
covenants also contain a request for damages. The judicial 
ascertainment clause only affects forfeiture and cancellation. 
Secondly, the judicial ascertainment clause requires a fk 
adjudication as to whether or not there exists a failure to perforc, 
the part of the respondent. Judicial economy requires that the 
determination be made, allowing a reasonable time for cure or 
forfeiture, in a single proceeding. 
Finally, in certain situations, such as the present, where 
the lessee's breach of its implied covenants is in bad faith, the 
court should not allow the lessee to shield its inactivity behind tr.' 
judicial ascertainment clause. As stated by Professor Merrill: 
Particular applications of the judicial 
ascertainment clauses may be invalid. For 
instance, they ought not to apply where the 
lessee has been guilty of such fraudulent or 
oppressive conduct as to destroy confidence 
which must be the basis of a proper relationship 
between the lessor and the lessee. Likewise, 
they should be invalid in so far as they attempt 
to relieve the lessee from liability of damages 
where the alternative decree will not afford the 
lessor full recompense for the lessee's wrongful 
conduct. Merrill "Lease Clauses Affecting 
Implied Covenants," Southwestern Legal Foundation, 
Second Annual Institute on Oil and Gas Law and 
Taxation, 141 at 187 (1951) quoted in 4 Williams, 
Oil and Gas Law, §682.4, n.5 at 366. 
Texas courts, which are quite experienced in matters si· 
to the present one, have rejected judicial ascertainment claus••· 
stated in Frick-Reid Suuply Corp. v. Meers, 52 :.i.W.2cl 11'), 1::-
(Tex.Civ.App. 1932): 
"We think this stipulation is void. If its terms 
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were observed, Meers and wife would be required to 
file a suit in the district court for the purpose of 
adjudicating the questions as to whether there had 
been a breach of any implied obligation and whether 
oil and gas was being produced in paying quantities. 
By the terms of the stipulation, that would end the 
suit, even though the facts should be determined 
against the lessees. The court would be precluded 
from rendering judgment upon such findings. Except 
in certain instances prescribed by statute, courts 
do not try cases by piecemeal • • • • Observance by 
the court of the terms of this stipulation would 
require a trial in which only the facts named in 
the stipulation could be judicially ascertained. 
Upon the determination of such facts, the lessee, 
according to the stipulation, is given a reasonable 
time thereafter to comply with his obligations or 
surrender the lease, reserving any producing well 
and ten acres surrounding it. This would require 
at least two trials and two final judgments. It 
would require, contrary to the provisions of article 
2209, a postponement of the rendition and entry of 
the judgment upon the facts ascertained, subject to 
the option and caprice of the lessee. Agreements 
relating to proceedings in civil cases and involving 
and providing for anything inconsistent with the full 
and impartial course of judgment therein are illegal 
While both common-law and statutory 
arbitrations are favored by the courts, and questions 
of fact may be conslusively settled in that way, the 
parties cannot by original contract or otherwise 
convert the trial and appellate court into mere 
boards of arbitration." 
The judicial ascertainment clause should not be allowed to 
use1 as a device to protect respondent when respondent acts in bad 
'1'.Lc, Likewise, 1t should not be used to wear down the appellants 
,, 1 multiplicity of actions. 
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IV. DISMISSAL OF THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION IIJ BOTH CASES \·IA. 
ERRONEOUS ON THE BASIS OF Tl-iE LOWER COURT' s RULI:JC AIJ[J KcSPOIJDE!I: · 
SUPPLEMENTING THEORIES. 
A. The First Cause of Action Involves Several Factual Issues 
Unresolvable by Summary Disposition. 
In its argument claiming that the first cause of action 
fails to state a claim against it, respondent ventures into factua: 
issues. Respondent states that the 1945 leases and the 1946 lease 
were significantly different. According to the respondents, the re;: 
reason for entering into the 1946 lease was to enable the parties t: 
strike a different deal. "Appellants predecessors plainly wanted to 
enter into the 1946 lease, because they did it." (Respondent's Br:e: 
at 21. Emphasis in the original). In light of the history 
surrounding the execution of the 1946 lease contained in the letter ' 
Carl Noel to a vice president of the respondent, (R.151), it ap;iea~s 
that agents for the respondent approached the appellants and their 
predecessors in interest requesting a second lease, claiming that 
since the seismographic work had been done, which was required unae: 
the lease of 1945, respondent wished to obtain a correcting lease 
omitting this clause.* 
Certainly the question of whether or not the appellants ~-
their predecessors wanted to enter into the 194(1 lease is a queest' 
*The court in Phillips Petroleum Company v. Peters0n, s~F•~. 
substantiates this: 
Phillips completed its seismogr~phic work anj 
having determined that the leaseholds lay witnin 
a favorable structure, proceeJeJ to taK" ~orre~tinn 
leases where there wece r1ir10r errur·s i:: t:.fJe J[,if.r I rial 
leases. 
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f•~t. not to be summarily disposed of before proper procedural and 
__ '_ Jentiary steps had been taken. 
Respondent claims that its capacity or lack of capacity to 
e~L~r into binding leases in the State of Utah in 1945 is far from 
rertain, implying that it was engaged in only "a few isolated 
traflsastions". (Respondent's Brief at 23-24). Tlle facts clearly 
indicate the opposite. Rather than being engaged only in "a few 
isolated transactions" the respondent was actively involved in leasing 
a large portion of the mineral interests in the Uintah Basin. 
?hillips Petroleum v. Peterson, supra at 928-929. By obtaining 
Interests in oil and gas leases respondent was certainly "doing 
OJsiness" in the State of Utah. 
However, the relevancy of this issue is questionable. The 
;a,_1 enacted and operative at that time states: 
[e] Every contract, agreement and transaction 
whatsoever made or entered into by or on behalf 
any corporation [failing to comply with the 
provisions of Sections 18-8-1 and 18-8-2] or 
to be executed or performed within this state 
shall be wholly void on behalf of such corporation 
and its assignees and every person deriving any 
interest therefrom .••• (Section 18-8-5 UCA 1933 
Emphasis added). 
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Although stressed in tile appellants' brief, it appears L 
needs to be emphasized again tllat when a contract is deemed to be 
void, it is "null, ineffectual, nugatory, having no legal force or 
binding effect, unable in law to support the purpose for wllicll it "' 
intended". Black's Law Dictionary at 1745. 
If the statute states that any contract or transaction 
entered into by a corporation which has not qualified itself to do 
businP.ss within the state is "wholly void," tllen that transaction, '. 0 
a nullity and cannot be ratified. Therefore, the 1946 lease cannoc, 
by itself, revitalize the 1~45 leases without the express intention: 
the part of the lessors that it do so. 
Hespondent attempts to imply that because the statute was 
amended in 1961, tile legislature has indicated tllat it had a differt:· 
intent. As mentioned above, and in the appellants' first brief, tne 
fact tlla t a transaction or contract is void, not voidable, means v.;· 
breath cannot be blown into it to give it life. It cannot be ratif:' 
without an express indication by the legislature of an intention to 
so. This follows Utah Code Ann. §68-3-3 (1953) which states, "No~: 
of these revised statutes is retroactive, unless expressly so 
declared." See also, Ferrel v. Pingree, 5 Ut. 443, 16 P. 843 
(1888). 
B. Failure to Allege a Duty to Speak is not GrouCJcis for 1:1s 0 1l ' 01 
the First Cause of Action with Pre ju l 1 c<'. 
Respondent co:n1•lains that thc;re was !lo .'!lle:;iitiur; ''·''' 
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,11 til a duty to disclose the fact that 1t had obtained the 1945 
~e8ses while it was not authorized to do business in the State of 
~tah. According to the respondent's interpretation, the appellants' 
'~llJre to plead this should result in the dismissal of the cause of 
oiction. 
Rule 8(e)(l) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states: 
"eact. averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise, and direct. No 
technical forms of pleading or motions are required." Rule 8(f) goes 
on to state, "all pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial 
Justice." 
In referring to the concept that fraud should be plead with 
~aniculari ty, Professor Moore states: 
There appears a tendency to allow great leniency 
where issues are complex, or the transactions 
involved cover a long period of time. 
The requirement of particularity does not abrogate 
Rule 8, and it should be harmonized with the general 
directives in subdivisions (a) and (e) of Rule 8 that 
pleadings should contain a "short and plain statement of 
the defense" and that each averment should be "simple, 
concise and direct." 2A Moore's Federal Practice, 
Paragraph 9.03 at 9-28. 
If there has in fact been a failure to plead all elements of 
:cJ wltn particularity, then the proper motion is not a motion to 
1 ~. but a motion for a more definite statement under Rule 
l't1e Appellants have Standing to Maintain a Cause of Action 
Sounding in Fraud. 
Because two of the appellants were not original signors of 
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the 1945 leases and the 1946 lease, resµoncent claims that they r.a,'. 
no standing. Respondent admits that one of the appellants, Audrey'.., 
Taylor, was an original lessor. Maxine Taylor Fazzio is her daught•· 
and Joseph Fazzio is Maxine's husband. The appellants have actually 
inherited the property, rather than purchased it. 
But respondent's argument of lack of standing indicates a 
failure to recognize or understand the true basis of the action for 
fraud. Fraud negated the intent necessary for the appellants and 
their predecessors to enter into and deliver a new lease in 1946. 
Bowman v. Cottrell, 15 Ida. 221 96 P. 936 (1908). They were not awa~-
of certain facts, known to the respondent, which were material to th' 
appellants' and their predecessors', decision to execute the 1946 
lease. There was no present intent at that time on the part of the 
appellants and their predecessors in interest to execute a new lease, 
they merely intended to correct certain "minor errors" as indicated'. 
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Peterson, supra. 
V. THE 1946 LEASE WAS NOT OPERATIVE, INDEPENDANT OF THE VOID 1945 
LEASES. 
Respondent claims that the 1946 lease, by its terms, clear: 
indicates the intention of all parties to replace the 1945 leases w1· 
the 1946 lease. This is a factual issue. The Peterson case, ~ra, 
and the letter of Carl tioel (H .151) raise factual issues allout tc 0 
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:arties' intention in executing the 1946 lease. Exactly what the 1946 
1edse was (that is, whether it was a corrective lease, merely 
·Jrrecting mistakes in the 1945 leases, or was a completely new lease, 
;nde!Jendent on its own) is unclear from the words contained therein. 
":,)rrection" and "in lieu of" together create this ambiguity. 
~ppellants' Brief at 27 and 28). 
VI. THE 1946 LEASE WAS ABANDONED OR SURRENDERED BY RESPONDENT'S 
ACCEPTANCE OF THE 1954 LEASE AND ITS SUBSEQUENT RELEASE. 
The amended complaint, in the Third Cause of Action in Case 
~a. 19161, alleges that respondent's interest in the lands excluded 
from participating in the Roosevelt Unit were merged into a 1954 lease 
~bich was released a year later by the respondent. The respondent 
;c•stions why, if this in fact happened, was no action brought from 
1J55 until the present challenging respondent's claim. As is evident 
fro~ the affidavit of Joseph Fazzio, the appellants were not aware 
~~at the respondent claimed an interest in the non-participating lands 
:Y,erej by Case No. 19161. (R.122, paragraph 2). It is obvious that 
'~~·llants believed that the 1955 release released respondent's 
'·•·rPst in these non-participating lands. 
Respondent goes on to raise questions concerning appellants 
'''·'t: of rental checks on these parcels. Again, this is a 
" uf fact. Were appellants aware from these rental checks that 
,til checks covered the non-participating lands? 
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Tne r'_:'Sf:,'1-1 1deri~ 'laims tf1dt the ~aw "wll l not compl-"l 11 , 
of t11e estates '.)r 1 t ls r:ot in t'.ie i:iterests of the pOJ.rty unle 0 ., 
is an intention on the part of the parties that merger exists." 
(:iespoT1Jent's Brief at p.31). As indicated in the appellants' Dr'.' 
\at 33! this is a question of fact. 
At no time in the entire proceedings has the respondent 
attempted to explain the existence of the 1954 lease. If respnn1• 
hel i an interest in the non-participating lands, why did it feel 
cocf P'.le l to enter into a fairly restrictive lease 1dth the less 
If tnere is any question of intent, it should be fairly clear tha' 
p3rt1.-,s iT1tendecJ that any lease.>iold interest the responjent heU '.:. 
t'ie non-participatin,;; lands was merged into the 1954 le3se, and t•:· 
this lease evidenced the rights and obligations of the parties as'. 
these non-participating lands. 
1he issue of surrender is not even addressed by the 
r't..'S!,J:1der-it. fiespowle:1t merely states that since tnis is a "ne>1" 
theory, the court is precluded from addressing it. Respondent its•. 
has rai~ed in its brief for the first time its theories concernin~ 
juJ1r1al ascertainment clause and the preclusion of an acti'.)n for 
br·e.L'il of th>" i'Tlplied C·JvenJ11t~ by rc'iison of par'a,r,rap•1 12 •i'.' t· ·· 
dPl,i or~ration Of t~e U~Jit ~~r~e~en~. 
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Attention should again be drawn to the fact that this 
ii tion employs rules of civil procedure which provide for notice 
The situation before this court is not one where the battle 
,~r ~ave been clearly drawn by the adversarial proceejings. There 
lJPer1 no answer to the amended complaint, no discovery has been 
~,,~, and no trial has been allowed to the appellants on this matter. 
,c s'1cl1, respondent's claim that this court cannot consider the 
;.es~ion of whether or not the 1946 lease was surrendered by virtue of 
eapondent's acceptance of the 1954 lease, even though those facts 
•ern contained in the amended complaint, is not in accordance with 
l 0 rlying principles and rules governing civil procedure in this 
Meferring to the federal rules which are identical to the 
:c,', Rules of Civil Procedure in this matter, it has been said: 
The federal rules have avoided one of the sore 
spots of code pleading. The federal courts are 
not hampered by the morass of decisions as to whether 
a particular allegation is one of fact, evidence 
or law. All that is required is a "short plain 
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 
entitled to relief." This requirement should be 
observerl. And pursuant to Rule 8(e), "each 
averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise 
and direct." 
* * * 
lne ~ourts have reco~nized the function of 
pleadings under the federal rules is to give fair 
n0tice or the clain asserted so as to enable the 
:11verse party to answer and prepare for trial, 
tn allow for the application of the doctrine of 
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res judicata, and to show the type of case 
brought, so that it might be assigned to the 
proper form of trial. 2A Moore's Federal 
Practice, paragraph 8.13 at 8-97 to 8-103. (Emphasis 
in original). 
Liberality is afforded pleadings because the rules provid, 
for discovery of facts and formulation of issues. The court bel011 j'. 
not allow sufficient time for this formulation of issues through the 
use of discovery and pretrial conferences. What is required is tha: 
the opposing party be put on notice of the facts underlying the 
theories, not specifically the theories themselves. 
This Court has addressed this issue in Rich v. McGovern,:: 
P.2d 1266, 1268 (Utah 1976), stating: 
Defendants also contend that the plaintiffs 
raised in their brief in this court for the 
first time matters which were not presented to 
the District Court, and hence should not be 
considered here. The principle is correct. 
But its application here is not. Upon 
examination we find that, though the pleadings 
and submission speak in generality, the 
critical matters recited above pertaining 
to plaintiffs' claims of fraud were sufficiently 
set forth in the pleadings, affidavits and 
depositions. 
Here, the record below, through allegations contained 1~: 
amended complaint, the letter of Carl Noel (R.l':il), the affidavit:: 
Joseph Fazzio and exhibits thereto (R.122) and the exhibits obtal~ 
from the records of the United States Geologiral Surveys filed cG 
Roosevelt Unit (R.122) indicate that chere may have been a surrP"' 
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, indonment of respondent's interest in the non-participating lands 
its acquisition of the 1954 lease covering those lands. 
These facts also raise the issue of whether Phillips 
'.~~endei to abandon its claims under the 1946 lease when it released 
t'" 1954 lease and failed to further develop the non-participating 
·"'' 1s. Abandonment is the voluntary or intentional release of a known 
r'.ght. hook v. James E. Russell Petroleum, Inc, 658 P.2d 1059, 1061 
~an. App.1983). When a lessee holds a lease but does not exercise 
l:s rights for development for a significant period of time the lease 
"1aJ be deemed to be abandoned. Rook, supra at 1061. See also Crocker 
,, Humble uil and Refining Co., 419 P.2d 265 (Okla. 1966); Kunc v • 
. cc.q,er-~urner, 297 P.2d 371 (Okla. 1956). 
The abandonment, as pointed out in the appellants' brief, 
,,,a, 11ot ~e just abandonment of the rights under the lease, but also an 
~ta~1onment of the purposes for which the lease was granted by lessor. 
,5 stateri in Dross Oil Royalty Co. v. Texas Co., 137 P.2d 934 (Okla. 
-!"3 to permit the lessee to hold the lease for an unreasonable 
.ec1,;t:1 or time for merely speculative purposes, is to allow it to 
t~ct its own interest and to disregard the interest of the lessor. 
1itions do not indicate to it that further development will be 
cit,lt', it is only fair that, after reasonable time has expired, 
: '•·'1.Jer· the u11developed portion of the lease and allow lessor to 
t 11e development by others. 
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Once a lease is abandoned it completely terminates the 
leasehold interest and the former lessee cannot reacquire mineral 
rights without obtaining a new lease. Superior Oil Co. v. Devon, ~. 
F.2d 1063, 1070 (8th Cir. 1979). Because the action (or more aptly 
inaction) by the lessor, notice is not necessary and irrelevant. 
Cameron v. Lebow, 388 S.W. 2d 399 (Ky. 1960); Smyth v. Kaplin, 294 
S.W.2d 525 (Ky. 1956). 
Respondent also objects to the appellants' discussion of 
novation because, according to the respondents, it is either 
repetitive of the questions of merger or inaccurately characterizes 
the theory of' novation. Respondent contends that novation is limite: 
to transactions in which the substitute contract contains a new part;, 
This is too narrow a definition. Referring to Black's Law Dictiona~ 
(at 1212), novation is tne "substitution of a new contract between t: 
same or different parties." This Court, in Robison v. Hansen, 594 
P.2d 867 (Utah 1979) has termed a substitute contract between the sa"· 
parties also as a novation. 
If novation is, as respondent claims, merely another name 
for the merger theory, then respondent's whole objection to the 
introduction of surrender is baseless. These theories rely upon, 
basically, the same facts which were plead in the amended complain'. 
They all lead to the same conclusion; that is, that respondent and 
appellants by entering into the agreement of r1ar·r-h 11, ll)Sc', "''' 
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,, , lease modified the terms of the lease and the unit agreement and 
:~anged the nature of the interest claimed by respondent in the 
~on-participating lands. When respondent failed to comply with the 
terms of this new contractual relationship and released its property 
~nterest, respondent no longer had claim to the non-participating 
lands under the 1946 lease. 
vu. THE TEKnS OF THE UNIT AGREEMENT IMPLY THAT NON-PARTICIPATING 
LANDS MUST BE RELEASED. 
In refuting appellants' argument that language contained in 
the unit agreement and the leases in question lead to the conclusion 
c'iat non-participating lands must te released, repondent replies only 
wit1 general statements of the law. Respondent's general position is 
t~ot non-participating lands may be held by production on the unit if 
:ne unit lands and the non-participating lands are in the same lease. 
~•ever, the language in the unit agreement and the lease, and the 
f1~ts indicate that the circumstances in the instant case are quite 
Jiffer·ent. In none of the cases cited by the respondent is there a 
situation similar to this where the lessee is required to pay delay 
renta!s on lands excluded from participation in production royalties. 
production itself holds those lands, then why did the parties 
,., , ,j r"' the lessee to pay delay rentals? 
Hespondent appears to agree that if it did not pay these 
ntals it would lose all rights it purports to claim in the 
1 lands. Therefore, respondent is holding the 
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non-participating lands, not by prndu~tl•n1, but by the payroer1t Ge 
delay rentals. The result ls that the lease coverin6 these 
non-participating lands becomes a no-term lease, 1. e. a lease wit:, 
a primary term which may be held in perpetuity by the lessee, not 
through production, but by payment of delay rentals above. No-terc 
leases have long been disfavored by the courts because of their 
inherent unfairness allowing sµeculation on the p&rt of the le:see 
without requiring the lessee to meet its side of the bargain, that 
to produce oil and gas from the leasehold. 2 :::iummers Oil & Gas, ,,:". 
Either the lessee's rights to the excluded property are 
preserved by payment of delay rentals for a specific term, or its 
payment of delay rentals was intended to preserve its rights 
indefinitely. If the latter is the case, then it is so inherer.c:· 
unfair and one-sided that the unit agreement, as it pertains to the 
non-participating lands, is unenforceable. Federal uil Co. v. 'ties''' 
Oil Co., 111 F. 373, aff'd 121 F. 674 (7th Cir. 1902); Lannan v. 
Jones, 268 P. 521 (Colo. 19;!b J; National uil & Pipeline Co. v. 
'l'eale, 67 S.W. 545 (Tex. Civ. App. 1902). 
CO~ICUJ3IO'J. 
If nothing else, respondent's brief clearly injicatPs t'' 
there are several unresolvej factual issues relatin~ to a~~~1.~ 
causes of action which pre~luje t~1eir· .Jis"licc;;1l 11n J'·r f·'.Jl'° L 
the Utah hules of' Civil f-r,,ce:•1ur·c. 
develop the evidence, offer proof' ut1 tr1e ·1rir'•< JL·· 1 ,. 
and to exercise their ri6nt t(J c\Jr11'r 1 ;r1t~ t~,,,_. r .. -,, 1,· 1:. 11'',~ 1r1 ct 
trial. 
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DATED this 11!:. day of October, 1983. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS 
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 
DISTRICT OF KANSAS 
AMOCO PRODUCTION CCMPANY, 
a corporation 
Plaintiff 
Vs. 
DOUGLAS ENERGY CCMPANY, INC. 
et al 
Defendants 
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 
No. 82 1865 
This matter comes before the court on plaintiff 
Amoco Production Company's (Amoco) motion to dismiss counterclaims 
of Defendant Douglas Energy Company (Douglas) and individual 
lessor defendants for failure to state a claim pursuant to 
Rule 12(b) (6), Fed.R.Civ.P. Amoco also moves for judgment 
on the pleadings and a stay of discovery pending resolution 
of these motions. The court, having heard oral arguments 
and having reviewed the briefs submitted by the parties, is 
now prepared to rule on all pending motions. 
Amoco filed this suit seeking a declaration that 
top leases granted Douglas by lessor defendants covering 
rnmproducing formations constitute an obstruction of Amoco's 
leasehold rights (claim 1), a declaration that it is presently 
under no obligation to release of record any nonproducing 
[XHIBIT "B" 
formations (claim 2), an order enjoining Douglas from acquiri!i 
further top leases or otherwise interferring with Amoco's 
contractual rights under its leases (claim 3), damages for 
tortious interference with its contractual relations with 
lessors (claim 4), an order directing Douglas to release of 
record its top leases (claim 5), and damages for slander of 
title (claim 6). Amoco's motion for judgment on the pleadings 
is directed to claims 1, 2, 3, and 5. Accompanying its 
answer, Douglas asserts as a counterclaim a request for 
declaratory judgment that Amoco has breached an implied 
covenant for further exploration. Douglas also has countercla;· 
for damages for slander of title. Individual lessors assert 
a single counterclaim of breach of implied covenants for 
further exploration and development and request, as does 
! Douglas, partial cancellation of Amoco's leases. 
At the outset, the court notes that Amoco has 
filed no replies to the counterclaims of Douglas and the 
individual lessor defendants. Rule 12(c), Fed.R.Civ.P., 
,, 
" states in pertinent part: 
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1 
but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party 
"After the pleadings are closed, 
,, may move for judgment on the pleadings." Rule 7(a), Fed.R.Civ 
indicates that where a counterclaim is asserted a reply is 
,, required before the pleadings are closed. See 5 Wright & 
2 
:I 
,, 
Miller, Federal Practice ~Procedure, §1367 at page 687. 
Therefore, absent replies to defendant's counterclaims, the 
court may consider Amoco's Rule 12(c) motion only if it 
first dismisses the counterclaims. Since the court denies 
in part Amoco's motions to dismiss, the motion for judgment 
on the pleadings is not properly before the court at this 
ti.me and is dismissed without prejudice. Of course the 
court realizes, as do the parties, that the motions to 
dismiss address substantially the same issues that are 
raised in the motion for judgment on the pleadings. 
As to Amoco's motions to dismiss for failure to 
state a claim, the applicable rule is that a claim should 
not be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b) (6) unless it appears 
beyond a doubt that a pleader can prove no set of facts in 
support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. 
Conley'!'.....:_ Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). The factual 
allegations of the pleading must be taken as true and all 
reasonable inferences must be indulged in favor of the 
pleader. Mitchell'!'.....:_ King, 537 F.2d 385 (10th Cir. 1976). 
I' Furthermore, pleadings are to be liberally construed to 
determine if there is any possibility of recovery. Gast-A-
~_£, Inc. v. American Petrofina, Inc., 484 F.2d 1102 (10th 
Cir. 1973). Motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim 
are viewed with disfavor and are rarely granted. 5 Wright & 
3 
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Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, §1357 at 598. 
Amoco contends that defendants are prevented from 
obtaining relief on their counterclaims for breach of implied 
covenants for essentially three reasons. First, it is 
contended that the top leases are presently invalid since 
they purport to be effective as of the time of their executio:. 
Second, it is argued that the top leases constitute an 
obstruction relieving Amoco of further responsibility for 
performance under any implied covenants. Third, it is 
argued that defendants are prevented from asserting a claim 
for lease forfeiture because of absence of prior demand for 
performance of implied covenants, and because the counterclait 
do not allege a legally sufficient excuse for failure to 
make such a demand. 
The proposition that Douglas' leases are presently 
invalid rests on Amoco's argument that its leases remain 
valid as to all formations since production in paying quantit: 
has been established. Amoco contends that this is the test 
the court should apply in view of defendants' prior actions 
and the assertion in their counterclaims that Amoco's leases 
have already terminated as to nonproducing formations. The 
prior actions referred to are the execution of top leases 
granting Douglas the right to make demand on any existing 
4 
oil and gas lessee to release of record nonproducing zones, 
and Douglas' actual demand for release made prior to the 
institution of this lawsuit. These actions, it is argued, 
evidenced an intention to challenge the existing leases as 
having already terminated. Moreover, in view of the principle 
that breach of an implied covenant never results in automatic 
termination or forfeiture, see Christiansen Y.:. Virginia 
Drilling~· Inc., 170 Kan. 355, 226 P.2d 263 (1951), Amoco 
argues that its leases could have previously terminated only 
by breach of their express terms. Therefore, .Amoco contends 
that defendants' actions and allegations in effect confine 
the issue to whether the habendum clause of its leases has 
been satisfied, rather than whether a breach of implied 
covenant has occurred. 
The court finds this to be an unduly restrictive 
characterization of defendants' theory of recovery. Neither 
the counterclaims, nor Douglas' previous demand for release, 
nor the top leases themselves disclose an intent to attack 
, Amoco's leases on the basis of cessation of production. 
Douglas' demand for release could more accurately be characterize( 
as premature and hence ineffective, but the court does not 
believe this action alone frames the issues now before the 
court and renders the top leases necessarily invalid. The 
5 
'I 
'i ,, 
:· 
r 
mere conferring of the right to demand release is not 
determinative where, as here, the leases were expressly 
granted subject to all valid preexisting oil and gas leases. 
A reasonable interpretation is that the top leases would 
become effective only to the extent any existing leases were 
determined invalid. A request for such a determination has 
been made in the form of defendants' counterclaims for 
partial lease cancellation. Though the counterclaims express 
a legal conclusion that Amoco's leases have terminated as to 
nonproducing formations, defendants clearly seek a judicial 
determination of termination and request partial cancellation 
based on prior breach of implied covenants. Defendants' 
claims for relief are not insufficient merely because they 
request a present determination of a prior breach. See 
Superior Oil Co. ~Devon Corp., 458 F.Supp. 1063 (D.Neb. 
1978), reversed on other grounds 604 F.2d 1063 (8th Cir. 
1979); Robinson v. Continental Oil Co., 255 F.Supp. 61 
(D.Kan. 1966). Such a judicial determination would not 
constitute the legal equivalent of automatic termination 
under express lease terms. 
The issues raised by defendants' counterclaims arE 
whether Amoco, prior to the execution of the Douglas leases 
failed to satisfy an implied covenant to explore (assert~·' 
6 
by bot~ Douglas and the individual lessors) or an implied 
covenant to Jevelop (asserted by individual lessors} • The 
countercl~ims are not subject to dismissal under the theory 
that Amoco's leases are perpetuated by production. Similarly, 
the proposition must fail that dismissal is appropriate 
since the top leases, and Douglas' demand, constitute an 
obstruction. The claims that Amoco has breached its implied 
covenants focuses on events prior to execution of the top 
leases. 
Amoco's third basis for challenging defendants' 
counterclaims for cancellation is the more serious from the 
vantage point of defendants' ultimate ability to prevail on 
the merits. Normally, a demand for performance of an implied 
covenant is necessary before a court will grant a claim for 
lease forfeiture. Robinson ~Continental Oil ££:.._, supra, 
at 64; Cowman~ Phillips Petroleum Co., 142 Kan. 762, 51 
Pac.2d 988 (1935). The purpose of such a demand is to put 
the lessee on notice that he has breached an implied covenant 
and provide him the opportunity to perform and avoid the 
harsh remedy of forfeiture. Superior Oil Co~, 603 F.2d at 
1069. A demand for performance, however, may be excused 
where it appears that it would be futile. See 5 Kuntz, a 
Treatise on the Law of Oil and Gas, S 62. 4 ( 1978 l . See also 
7 
Howerton~ Kansas Natural Gas~· Bl Kan. 553, 106 Pac. 47 
(1910), reversed on other grounds, 82 Kan. 367, 108 Pac. 813 
( 1910) . 
As to the claims of breach of an implied covenant 
to explore, defendants allege that a prior demand for perfonna 
was unnecessary, and in effect would have been futile, in 
view of an extended period of inactivity despite Amoco's 
knowledge of the production potential of the unexplored 
fonnations. It is alleged that Amoco was aware of its 
obligations to explore the leases in question as a result of 
its production fran deep fonnations in the area, as well as 
on the basis of available test data indicating the carunercial 
production potential of the nonproducing fonnations. It is 
not alleged that any individual lessors ever demanded 
perfonnance of implied covenants to explore or develop prior 
to granting the top leases. However, during oral presentatioc 
counsel for defendants argued that discovery might be helpful 
in revealing relevant carununications between Amoco and 
lessor defendants. 
Amoco refers the court to the recent Eighth Circuit 
, 1 decision of Superior Oil ~~Devon Corp., supra, wherein 
1 the court held that the notice and demand requirement is not 
waived by the mere passage of what is deemed to be an 
unreasonable period of time. At trial defendants may wel I 
have to show more than a mere passage of time to satisfy 
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waiver of the notice and demand requirement. As to a threshold 
motion to dismiss, however, it is sufficient the defendants 
allege futility based on Amoco's inactivity and its knowledge 
of production potential of the deeper formations. Defendants 
are entitled to the opportunity at trial to satisfy waiver 
of the demand requirement by showing a manifested intention 
on the part of Amoco not to undertake further develo?Dent or 
exploration. 
While the counterclaims for partial cancellation 
sufficiently state a claim for relief, Douglas' individual 
claim for damages must be dismissed. Douglas has indicated 
that it is proceeding on the theory that Amoco's leases 
should be declared invalid as to the deeper formations 
because of a prior breach of an implied covenant to explore. 
Douglas does not contend that Amoco's leases expired under 
any express lease provisions. However, the counterclaim for 
damages is premised upon Amoco's failure upon demand to 
release of record the deep formations. 
The court notes that in Kansas there are statutory 
provisions for obtaining release of terminated or forfeited 
oil and gas leases. See K.S.A. 55-201, ~ ~· These 
statutes provide the basis for recovery of damages for 
failure upon demand to release of record a lease that has 
9 
terminated by express terrr.s or has been judicially deterr 1 c. 
to be for felt e::J . 
\<.1-.1 le Dowg las states it does not rely upon the 
statwtory scheme as the basis for its damage claim, it is 
clear that any claim for damages resulting frcrn a failure tc 
release titles of record requires an obligation to do so at 
the tl.1!1e the demand is made. 
Douglas' claim for damages for slander of its 
titles is inconsistent with its claim for cancellation of 
its leases as to the deep formations. Under the latter 
cla=. Amoco's leases remain valid unless, and until, declare 
invalid. To prevail on the former claim, it must be shown 
that A.'1'.oco had a prior obligation to release formations of 
record. J\moco could have been placed under such an obligaL: 
only if its leases had been rendered invalid by their expres• 
ter.:-.s or by a prior judicial finding of forfeiture. If the 
leases are presently capable of coexisting, as the court ha! 
herein found, it follows that neither party may be require: 
to release its leases of record until the court has made a 
final deten:-.1nat1or. of the issues presented in this case. 
The court has already indicated during oral arg~ 
that disco-:ery '•1111 be s:ayed perid1nci rescl'1t ion of thr 
motions no~ ~~~0~ co~s1~er~t:c~. H ,-, .... ;e ._. c r , t ~ c c O'.....: rt n ,""·., 
deems it appropriate to enter a further discovery order 
consistent with its decision to bifurcate trial of this 
action. Having considered prior representations of the 
parties concerning bifurcation as to the issues of liability 
and damages, the court believes that bifurcation pursuant to 
Rule 42(b), Fed.R.Civ.P., represents an expeditious and 
econc:rnical procedure for resolution of this action. Accordingly, 
discovery will be restricted to the issue of liablity. The 
court recognizes there may be instances where discovery 
might appropriately overlap issues of liability and damages. 
If and when this occurs, discovery need not be restricted as 
herein ordered if the parties can agree. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that pliantiff's motion 
for judgment on the pleadings is hereby dismissed without 
prejudice. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff's motion to 
d1src.iss defendants' counterclaims requesting lease cancellation 
are denied, and that plaintiff's motion to dismiss defendant 
Douglas' counterclaim for damages is granted. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this action be bifurcated 
for separate trials of the issues of liability and damages, 
and that discovery be restricted to the issue of liability 
Pxrept ~here the parties can agree otherwise. 
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Dated this //-fj_ day of February, 1983, at 
Wichita, Kansas. 
Sam A. Crow 
u. S. District Judge 
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